Andrew Gillen
Note, this post updates last month’s post. The biggest changes from last month include:
Update on the lawsuits regarding the SAVE plan to reflect the court injunctions.
Update on the prospects of the SAVE and HEA plan in light of the Supreme Court overturning Chevron deference.
Added an estimate of the cost of the student loan payment pause from new academic research.
Mass student loan forgiveness is terrible policy (see this report for a comprehensive list of reasons), but that hasn’t stopped the Biden administration from trying to forge ahead. While the Supreme Court overturned the Biden administration’s student loan forgiveness plan, every few weeks, the administration announces another batch of loans that have been forgiven.
In fact, the administration recently celebrated that since taking office, it has succeeded in forgiving $167 billion of student loans for 4.75 million borrowers by transferring the financial burden from the students who took out the loans to taxpayers who did not. And they aren’t going to stop—the administration’s spokeswoman declared, “President Biden has vowed to use every tool available to cancel student debt for as many borrowers as possible, as quickly as possible.” And President Biden himself stated, “I will never stop working to cancel student debt—no matter how many times Republican elected officials try to stop us.”
But if student loan forgiveness lost in the Supreme Court, how are so many student loans still being forgiven? The answer is that there isn’t a student loan forgiveness plan, there are many plans, some of which are already up and running.
Previous laws had already left many methods to forgive student loans, and many of those laws may allow the Secretary of Education to expand those programs. The administration also claims existing law allows it to create new ways to forgive student loans. So the student loans the Biden administration already has or wants to forgive are a combination of existing programs, existing programs the Biden administration has expanded, and new programs the administration is seeking to implement.
Here’s a rundown of the administration’s student loan forgiveness plans and actions, which I’ll update monthly.
HEROES (New plan – overturned in court)
This was the big plan that got a lot of attention in 2022 and 2023. The plan was to forgive $10,000 for borrowers making less than $125,000, and $20,000 for borrowers who received a Pell Grant, at a total cost of $469 billion to $519 billion. The alleged authority for the plan was the 2003 HEROES Act. While designed to alleviate loan‐related hardships for soldiers and reservists serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, the law also covered national emergencies, and the Biden administration argued the COVID-19 emergency gave it the authority to forgive virtually everyone’s loans. Most observers were skeptical of this supposed authority, but it was not clear who had standing to sue (standing is the requirement that those filing the suit have a concrete injury from the policy). The companies that service student loans would be the most obvious injured party, but there was a perception that the Biden administration would punish any servicer that challenged the policy in court, a perception that now appears accurate.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court ruled that Missouri had standing to sue (due to a quasi‐public student loan servicer that would lose revenue under the plan) and that the plan violated the major questions doctrine (which holds that there needs to be clear congressional authorization for programs of substantial economic or political significance), preventing the policy from being implemented.
Higher Education Act (New plan – forthcoming)
Immediately after losing on HEROES, the Biden administration announced a new effort that would use authority under the Higher Education Act. The administration announced the new plan, which would
Waive unpaid interest.
Forgive debt for those who have repaid for 20 years (25 years if there is debt for graduate school).
Forgive debt for those who attended a low‐financial value program (e.g., programs or colleges that fail the Cohort Default Rate or Gainful Employment).
There is also a plan to release additional regulations soon that will forgive debt for those undergoing financial hardship.
There are a several problems with this plan, which the Penn Wharton Budget Model estimates will cost $84 billion. The public comment window on the proposed regulations recently concluded, and the administration is now considering those comments and will issue final regulations, with a goal to start forgiving debt this fall. Once finalized, this plan will likely be overturned by the courts for two main reasons. First, it is likely to run afoul of the major questions doctrine, just as the HEROES plan did. Second, the Supreme Court recently overturned Chevron deference, which held that courts should defer to executive agencies when a statute was ambiguous.
With major questions and no Chevron deference, it is very hard to imagine the courts allowing the administration to stretch vague clauses in old laws into vast new powers authorizing billions of dollars in forgiveness. However, much of this forgiveness is easy to implement, so a key question is whether a court injunction will come fast enough to prevent the administration from forgiving billions of debt before the courts can determine whether the regulations are legal.
SAVE (New plan – still active)
Before diving into this one, it is important to understand the concept of income‐driven repayment (IDR). Under traditional (mortgage) style loan repayment, the amount and length of repayment are fixed (e.g., $200 a month for 10 years). For the past few decades, the federal government has been introducing IDR plans, in which the amount repaid each month varies based on the borrower’s current income and the length of repayment varies based on how fast they repay their loan. The key features of an income‐driven repayment plan are:
the share of income owed each month (e.g., 20 percent);
the income exemption that is protected from any repayment obligation (e.g., the poverty line); and,
the cap on length of repayment (e.g., twenty‐five years)
IDR is a great idea, providing borrowers with better consumption smoothing across their lifetime and flexible repayment which helps avoid defaults due to short‐term liquidity constraints.
But we’ve also botched the implementation. To begin with, a cap on the length of repayment is completely inappropriate. Income‐driven repayment ensures that payments are always affordable, and borrowers who make so little they do not repay will receive de facto forgiveness even without the cap, so there is no justification for a cap on the length of repayment.
The other problem with how we’ve implemented income‐driven repayment is political—the plans are tailor‐made to allow politicians to give constituents big benefits today while sticking future taxpayers with the bill. It is therefore no surprise that these plans have gotten more generous over time. The first IDR plan, introduced in 1994, had an income exemption equal to the poverty line, a share of income owed of 20 percent, and a cap on length of twenty‐five years. Very few borrowers would receive forgiveness under these terms, and of those who did, they really wouldn’t have been able to repay regardless of whether they received forgiveness or not. The Obama administration introduced plans with an income exemption of 150 percent of the poverty line, a share of income owed of 10 percent, and a cap on length of payment of twenty years.
The Biden administration’s Saving on a Valuable Education (SAVE) plan took an existing plan (the REPAYE plan) and made it much more generous. It changes the share of income owed from 10 percent to 5 percent, increases the income exemption from 150 percent of the poverty line to 225 percent, and caps the length of repayment at as little as ten years for some borrowers. By cranking every possible lever to the most generous settings in history, this plan would impose massive costs on taxpayers, estimated at $475 billion for just the next ten years.
The legal questions facing this plan are the reverse of the HEROES plan. For the HEROES plan, the main obstacle was standing. Once that hurdle was cleared, it was fairly obvious that the plan was well beyond what Congress had authorized. But for the SAVE lawsuits, this is reversed. Standing is easily established (for Missouri at least), but the plan does have a much stronger argument for being within the parameters of the law. Mark Kantrowitz thinks SAVE will be upheld, while Michael Brickman did yeoman’s work digging up details on page 18,909 of the 1993 Congressional Record that may lead to SAVE being scrapped.
Parts of the SAVE plan have already been implemented, and full implementation was scheduled for July 2024. The plan has already forgiven “$5.5 billion for 414,000 borrowers.” However, two lawsuits seek to overturn the plan, one by Kansas and ten other states (though a court ruled that only three of the states had standing to sue), and another by Missouri and six other states. Ironically, an injunction pausing further implementation was issued by courts in both cases on the same day. The injunctions affected different parts of the plan. “The Kansas order suspended parts of the program that were not already in place, including a big drop in monthly payments for people with undergraduate debt — to 5 percent of their discretionary income from 10 percent… The judge in Missouri blocked any new debt cancellation achieved through the SAVE program.” Thus, the only big change from the SAVE plan that is currently in effect is the increase in the income exemption from 150 percent to 225 percent of the poverty line. Unless successfully appealed, these injunctions will freeze further implementation of the SAVE plan until courts have determined whether the plan is legal.
The Supreme Court’s overturning of Chevron deference is also likely to affect these cases in a major way. Now that courts are no longer required to defer to executive agencies when statutory language is ambiguous, it will be much harder to convince courts that the president spending close to half a trillion dollars over the next ten years on this plan is consistent with congressional intent.
Student Loan Payment Pause (Existing and extended plan – now expired)
When COVID-19 hit in March 2020, student loan payments were paused. The pause was supposed to last two months, but ended up lasting three and a half years after Trump extended it once and Biden extended it six times. A pause would not normally result in massive student loan forgiveness as it would delay, but not waive, repayment. There would still be a cost to taxpayers (driven by the government’s cost of borrowing), but it wouldn’t be huge. But recall that IDR plans (unnecessarily) cap the length of repayment, and the pause counted towards that cap. In other words, for any student that does not fully repay before they hit the length of repayment cap, payments weren’t paused, they were waived. We won’t know for many years how many students had their payments forgiven rather than postponed, but the current estimates range from $210 billion to $240 billion.
New research from Sylvain Catherine, Mark Pérez Clanton, and Constantine Yannelis finds that the substantial inflation and counting the pause towards the cap on repayment reduced the present value of future student repayments by around 25 percent.
There is virtually no chance for this burden on the taxpayer to be reversed. The only good news is that the payment pause ended, with most borrowers restarting payments in October 2023.
Public Service Loan Forgiveness (Existing and extended plan – still active)
The Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program was established during the George W. Bush administration and allowed for public and nonprofit workers to receive forgiveness after ten years of repayment when they used an IDR plan. While I object to PSLF in principle (as a distorting and non‐transparent subsidy for the government and nonprofit sectors) and due to the windfalls these borrowers receive (an average of over $70,000 per beneficiary), since PSLF legally exists, it should operate as seamlessly as possible.
The Biden administration granted many waivers and other changes to increase the number of borrowers who could benefit under PSLF. For example, the administration introduced a waiver that allowed for payments made under non‐IDR plans to count toward the payment limit (previously, only payments made while enrolled in an IDR plan counted). Some of these changes were good in the sense that they more faithfully implemented the law, but the administration crossed some lines too. In particular, it started counting some types of deferment as payments (borrowers can get deferment when they cannot afford to make payments, which generally allows the borrower to temporarily postpone payments though interest continues to accrue). The whole point of deferment is to temporarily avoid making payments. So for the Biden administration to give borrowers credit for making payments when they were in deferment is logically, morally, and potentially legally wrong (Cato was part of a lawsuit seeking to end this abuse, but the case was thrown out when a court ruled the policy didn’t directly affect Cato enough to satisfy standing requirements). The administration also waived income requirements, making more people eligible for the program.
The Biden administration has forgiven “$68 billion in forgiveness for more than 942,000 borrowers” under these programs, which works out to around $72,000 per borrower. By comparison, a formerly homeless student who receives the maximum Pell Grant for four years would get less than $30,000 in Pell Grants. Some of this would have been forgiven even if the administration hadn’t made any changes to the program, but not all of it. In the future, these burdens on the taxpayer can be reduced by rolling back some of the administrative changes, but eliminating the program entirely would require legislation.
Borrower defense to repayment (Existing and extended plan – still active, though recent changes are paused during a court case)
When a college engages in fraud or severely misleads students, borrowers can have their debt forgiven under borrower defense to repayment. This is reasonable, as victims of fraud should have some recourse. It is also extremely rare because a college would not just need to dupe a student but would also need to fool a state, an accreditor, and the US Department of Education, as all three are required to sign off on the legitimacy of a college before its students can take out student loans. As the House Committee on Education & the Workforce noted, “for the first 20 years of the rule, there were 59 claims.”
However, the federal government can claw back debt forgiven from the responsible college. This makes borrower defense to repayment an incredibly powerful tool for progressives in their war on for‐profit colleges. If a for‐profit college can be declared to have substantially misled students, they can be ruined financially by the claw backs. Indeed, new regulations from the Biden administration would make it much easier to conclude a college engaged in misconduct. As the White House gloated, “Less than $600 million in debt relief had been approved through borrower defense, closed school discharges, and related court settlements from all prior administrations combined, compared to the $22.5 billion approved under the Biden‐Harris Administration alone.” Some of this was done outside the law. For example, $5.8 billion of debt for Corinthian Colleges students was forgiven even if students didn’t submit a borrower defense claim. The administration has promised to forgo claw backs on much of it (likely in part to avoid giving affected colleges standing to oppose the changes in court).
The good news is that any further forgiveness under the new regulation is on hold due to an injunction from the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals (this injunction applies to the closed school discharge plan as well).
Closed School Discharge (Existing and extended plan – still active, though recent changes are paused during a court case)
Borrowers whose school closes while they are still enrolled or shortly after they have withdrawn can have their student loans forgiven. The Biden administration imposed new regulations that loosened the requirements and has used this as an excuse to forgive other loans as well. For example, Biden forgave $1.5 billion in debt for students from ITT Technical Institute, even if they didn’t qualify for a discharge. Further forgiveness under the new regulations has been paused by the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals until courts determine whether the new regulations are legal. However, the administration can still forgive loans under the previous iteration of these regulations.
Total and Permanent Disability Discharge (Existing and extended plan –active)
Borrowers who are unable to work due to a permanent disability can have their loans forgiven. Historically this was very rare. And to protect against fraud, the income of borrowers who had their debt forgiven was monitored to ensure that they really couldn’t work. The Biden administration both expanded eligibility and dropped fraud detection efforts. In particular, in 2021, regulations were introduced that “provided automatic forgiveness for borrowers who were identified as eligible for a total and permanent disability discharge through a data match with the Social Security Administration. The Department had been using such a match for years to identify eligible borrowers but required them to opt in to receive relief.” Switching to the opt‐out model dramatically increased the number of borrowers receiving forgiveness. As a result of these changes, forgiveness under total and permanent disability discharge to spike from negligible amounts to $14.1 billion.
Waiving Interest
Another method the Biden administration is using to forgive loans is to waive interest. This plan is somewhat unique in that it is usually a component of another forgiveness plan, but the goal and methods are unique enough to warrant its own category.
Waiving interest has been implemented primarily through three mechanisms. The first was the student loan payment pause, which as noted above waived interest for three and a half years. The second were regulations that took effect in July 2023 that “ceased capitalizing interest in all situations where it is not required by statute (87 FR 65904). This includes when a borrower enters repayment, exits a forbearance, leaves any IDR plan besides Income‐Based Repayment (IBR), and enters default.” And the third is the SAVE repayment plan, which waives any unpaid interest.
Conclusion
In sum, Biden’s administration has been the most aggressive in history regarding student loan forgiveness. Despite many setbacks, the administration has cancelled a massive amount of debt ($167 billion and counting), with most of the burden on taxpayers still to come from future repayments that will no longer be made. And while many of its attempts to forgive student loans have been stymied, there are still many active plans in play, with more on the horizon.